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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 
Of the four types of operations (i.e., Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 121, Part 
Scheduled 135, Nonscheduled Part 135 and Part 91) that were examined, Scheduled Part 135 
shows the highest percentage of total accidents that involve icing (8.0 percent), the highest 
percentage of fatal accidents that involve icing (8.2 percent) and the highest percentage of 
fatalities in icing-related accidents (16.2% percent). 
 
If ramp- and security-related accidents are eliminated from the dataset, 9.5 percent of the total 
fatal air-carrier (Part 121) accidents are due to icing. This percentage is greater than for general 
aviation (Part 91) and commuter/air taxi (Part 135), which are 3.7 percent and 8 percent 
respectively. However, no fatal Part 121 icing-related accidents have occurred since 1994.  
 
Of the six Part 121 icing-related accidents in the dataset, three had turboprop engines, and the 
others were equipped with turbofan or turbojet engines. 
 
The highest percentage of icing-related reports in the voluntary Aviation Safety Reporting 
System (ASRS) database occurred in 2005, but the overall number of these events relative to 
the total is small (less than 1 percent). Of the 663 icing incidents reported, 141 resulted in the 
crew declaring an emergency.   
 
In Petty and Floyd’s review of airframe icing accidents from 1982-2000, 60 percent of Part 121 
accidents were fatal compared with 47 percent of general aviation (Part 91) accidents and 26 
percent of Part 135 accidents during the same time period.  
 
Only 0.5 percent of U.S. Army aircraft accidents are icing related, but this number is still of 
concern due to the Army’s strict regulations that forbid flight into known or severe icing 
conditions.  
 
A review of several studies by subject-matter experts was summarized into four high-priority 
icing research areas: (1) improved propulsion system tolerance to weather, (2) development of 
methods to sense and document actual icing conditions, (3) research to identify realistic ice 
accumulations to improve aircraft certification and pilot training, and (4) aircraft performance and 
handling qualities in icing conditions.  
 
Based on the Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) Project goals and objectives, the IRAC 
project is encouraged to conduct work in all of the high-priority icing research areas that were 
identified, with the exception of the developing of methods to sense and document actual icing 
conditions.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Purpose of Study 
 
NASA’s Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) Project is one of four projects within the 
agency’s Aviation Safety Program (AvSafe) in the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate 
(ARMD). The IRAC Project, which was redesigned in the first half of 2007, conducts research to 
advance the state of the art in aircraft control design tools and techniques. The purpose of this 
research is to ensure flight safety by providing on-board aircraft control resiliency even in the 
presence of adverse events, including loss of control caused by environmental factors (e.g., 
wind, icing), and actuator and sensor faults or failures (ref. 1 and 2). The significance of icing in 
the safety of subsonic transports is inconclusive based on the following statements: 
 
“Note that Icing Challenge is primarily a general aviation problem. Not seen by 
community as an issue in large transport category aircraft” (ref. 1).  
  
“Historical data also indicates icing is primarily considered a general aviation and Part 
135 issue” (ref. 1). 
 
“General aviation and Part 135 aircraft traditionally fly at lower altitudes and at slower 
speeds than air transport category aircraft; as a result, they are more likely to encounter 
icing conditions, including SLD (supercooled liquid droplets) environments”  (ref. 3). 
 
As a result, a “Key Decision Point” (ref. 1) was established for fiscal year 2007 with the following 
expected outcomes (ref. 1): 
 
(1) “Report and document utilizing the most current statistical/prognostic data available from 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and Aviation Safety Information Analysis 
and Sharing (ASIAS), the reports, incidents and accidents associated with icing for 
subsonic transports. 
(2) Report by subject matter experts in icing research on current knowledge of icing effects 
on control parameters. 
(3) Establish future requirements for icing research for subsonic transports including the 
appropriate alignment (IVHM: identification, IIFD: sensing and IRAC: flight control)” 
 
 
1.2 Overview of Study Contents 
  
The expected outcomes for this study are addressed in sequential order. Outcome 1 is 
addressed in section 2, which contains statistical analyses of accident and incident data; these 
analyses have been conducted by NASA researchers for this “Key Decision Point.” Outcome 1 
is also addressed in section 3, which contains an examination of icing in other recent statistically 
based studies. Outcome 2 is the focus of section 4, which is a summary of aviation safety 
priority lists that have been developed by various subject-matter experts, including the 
significance of aircraft icing research in these lists. Suggested future requirements for NASA 
icing research (outcome 3) are presented in section 5. Finally, discussion and the conclusions 
that have been drawn are provided in section 6.  
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2. NASA STATISTICAL ANALYSES 
 
As stated previously, the first expected outcome of this study is a report that documents the 
results of an examination of the most recent statistical/prognostic incident and accident data that 
is available to determine the significance of icing in subsonic transport accidents and incidents. 
This section contains the results of two separate statistical analyses that have been conducted 
by NASA to address this expected outcome. In the first statistical analysis, publicly available 
NTSB and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) accident and incident data were examined. A 
second statistical analysis was also conducted using the Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS) reports as the data source.  
 
2.1 NASA Analysis of NTSB Accident and Incident (A/I) Data 
 
A statistical analysis was conducted to look at trends in the number of icing-related events 
across a 16 year span (1988-2003) within the four areas of flight operation (Part 121, Scheduled 
Part 135, Nonscheduled Part 135, and Part 91). The word “event” is used here to encompass 
both accidents and incidents. These types of operations are also known as general aviation 
(Part 91), commuter/air taxi (Part 135), and air carrier (Part 121). In March 1997, the FAA 
changed the rules for the classification of major airlines so that air carriers with 10 or more 
seats, which previously were handled under Part 135 operations, would now be handled under 
Part 121 operations (ref. 4). The source for accident data is the NTSB Aviation Accident and 
Incident Data System, while the source for incident data is the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data 
System. Although both databases contain accident and incident data, the FAA has primary 
investigative responsibility for incidents, and the NTSB is the authority for accident investigation. 
 
Icing events were selected from the accident data in two ways. First, those accidents that had 
previously (ref. 5) been assigned the “Ice” category (using the Commercial Aviation Safety 
Team/International Civil Aviation Organization (CAST/ICAO) Common Taxonomy Team (ref. 6) 
accident category taxonomy) were separated from the rest of the accidents. These events 
included both on-ground and in-flight aircraft icing but did not include runway-surface icing. 
Some engine icing was included in this group, but only if airframe icing conditions also existed 
(i.e, rather than just carburetor icing). Also included were events that involved Pitot system icing, 
windshield icing, or in-flight icing of slush packed in the wheel wells. Second, accidents were 
selected that included a loss of engine power as a result of carburetor or induction icing, but for 
which no airframe icing was indicated; this is almost exclusively a general aviation 
phenomenon. 
 
Selection of icing events from the incident data was accomplished based on the following 
criteria: (1) if the data record indicated icing as a primary or secondary cause, or (2) if the words 
“ice,” “icing,” or “freezing rain” were found in the narrative text. All of these records were 
reviewed; those that involved only ground surface (runway) icing were excluded as were those 
in which the narrative specified an absence of icing conditions. Events that included a loss of 
engine power as a result of carburetor icing, induction icing or ice ingestion were not excluded. 
 
A summary of the number of icing events can be found in Table 1. Data for total flight hours per 
year were obtained from the tables that are published by the NTSB (ref. 7), which are based on 
data that is supplied by the FAA. Icing contributes to a very small percentage of accidents and 
incidents, that is, only 3.5 percent of accidents overall and 1.3 percent of incidents. However, 
fatal icing accidents comprise 4 percent of all fatal accidents, and 4.5 percent of all fatalities 
occurred in icing-related accidents (aggregate data not shown). Part 135 has the highest 
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percentage of icing-related events (as compared with the total number of accidents, both total 
and fatal) and the largest flight-hour-adjusted rates. By far the largest percentage of icing 
fatalities (as compared with total fatalities) is within Scheduled Part 135 operations (16.2 
percent), and the percentages in other flight categories are remarkably similar to one another 
(between 4.0 percent and 4.6 percent). Among fatal accidents, the lowest percentage that is 
attributable to icing is for Part 91 (3.6 percent), which is less than half the rate for Nonscheduled 
Part 135 operations (7.9 percent). 
 
 
Table 1. Types of Icing Events by Flight Operation  
 
Operation 
Type of event Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Nonscheduled 
Part 135 
Part 91 
Total flight hours 232,868,640 25,050,928 46,350,000 416,319,000 
Total fatal accidents 60 49 278 4599 
Fatal accidents with 
icing conditions 4 (6.7%) 4 (8.2%) 22 (7.9%) 165 (3.6%) 
Total fatalities 2151 328 664 8724 
Fatalities with icing 
conditions 99 (4.6%) 53 (16.2%) 27 (4.1%) 350 (4.0%) 
Total accidents 600 213 1070 23349 
Accidents with icing 
conditions 6 (1.0%) 17 (8.0%) 58 (5.4%) 321 (1.4%) 
Icing accidents per 
million flight hours 0.0258 0.679 1.25 0.771 
Accidents with 
carburetor icing only   3 (0.3%) 467 (2.0%) 
Carburetor icing 
accidents per million 
flight hours 
  0.065 1.122 
Total incidents 7497 2218 2082 29167 
Incidents with icing or 
carburetor icing 
conditions 
50 (0.7%) 32 (1.4%) 48 (2.3%) 390 (1.3%) 
Icing or carburetor icing 
incidents per million 
flight hours 
0.215 1.277 1.036 0.937 
 
 
Green suggests in his report on icing (ref. 8), that a relationship may exist between icing events 
and aircraft size. Many of the same aircraft are flown under Part 91 and Part 135, so one might 
expect the icing rates to be more similar in those groups. Perhaps the pilots who are operating 
under Part 91 are more able to delay their flights to avoid icing conditions, or perhaps the pilots 
who are operating under Part 135 overestimate either their own ability or the aircraft’s ability to 
handle the icing conditions. 
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In prior NASA examinations of aircraft accident rates (ref. 9), ramp-related events were not 
included because these events were perceived as occupational-health-related events. Security-
related events were also excluded because they fall under the domain of the Department of 
Homeland Security. Therefore, we decided to look within this same data subset at the 
significance of icing events. Specifically, we eliminated all security-related events (109 total 
events) and those for which the predominant issue was a ground-handling or ramp error (e.g. 
ground-crew errors, pushback/tow issues, inadequate preflight inspection). Ninety-five percent 
of these ground-handling accidents (274 total events) took place while the aircraft was on the 
ground or during takeoff; the remainder involved mostly separated doors or engine cowlings.  
 
Part 121 is the only operation that is impacted by this change (see Table 2). The percentage of 
fatal accidents that are attributable to icing jumps from 6.7 percent to 9.5 percent (now the 
highest of the four percentages), and the percentage of total fatalities jumps from 4.6 percent to 
6.2 percent (now second highest among the four groups).  
 
 
Table 2. Types of Icing Events by Flight Operation 
(Without ramp and security events) 
 
Operation 
Type of event Part 121 Schedule Part 
135 
Nonscheduled 
Part 135 
Part 91 
Total flight hours 232,868,640 25,050,928 46,350,000 416,319,000 
Total fatal accidents 42 48 275 4511 
Fatal accidents with 
icing conditions 4 (9.5%) 4 (8.3%) 22 (8.0%) 165 (3.7%) 
Total fatalities 1603 327 660 8628 
Fatalities with icing 
conditions 99 (6.2%) 53 (16.2%) 27 (4.1%) 350 (4.1%) 
Total accidents 534 203 1057 23055 
Accidents with icing 
conditions 6 (1.1%) 17 (8.4%) 58 (5.5%) 321 (1.4%) 
 
 
The icing-related events, shown as a percentage of total fatal accidents, total fatalities, and total 
accidents in Tables 1 and 2 are displayed in a side-by-side graphical format in the next three 
figures. For each of the four operations, icing-related accidents and incidents are displayed both 
with and without ramp- and security-related events. Again, note that the most visually significant 
difference occurs in the percentage of fatal accidents with icing conditions for Part 121 
operations (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Fatal accidents with icing conditions. 
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Figure 2. Total fatalities with icing conditions. 
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Figure 3. Total accidents with icing conditions. 
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Since 1988, no more than five icing-related events have occurred per year during Part 121 
flights, and the overwhelming majority of those were incidents (see Figure 4). In 35 of the 56 
events, no damage to the aircraft was noted and no injuries occurred. However, in four of the six 
accidents, the aircraft was destroyed, and fatal injuries occurred. A total of 99 persons died in 
icing-related accidents, but no fatal icing-related accidents have occurred since 1994. A 
downward trend is evident in the flight-hour-adjusted rates for icing events (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 4. Number of Part 121 icing events per year. 
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Figure 5. Rate of Part 121 icing events (per million flight hours). 
 
 
Among Scheduled Part 135 operations, more than 70 percent (35 of 49) of the icing events that 
are included in this analysis (see Figure 6) occurred prior to 1995, but just over half of the icing 
accidents (9 out of 17) have occurred since 1994. The flight-hour-adjusted rates for icing events 
may be increasing slightly (see Figure 7), or this may be an artifact of the major decrease in 
flight hours that is noted for Scheduled Part 135 operations since 1997. Of the four types of 
flight operations that were examined, Scheduled Part 135 operations show the highest 
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percentage of total accidents that involve icing (8.0 percent), the highest percentage of fatal 
accidents that involve icing (8.2 percent), and the highest percentage of fatalities in icing 
accidents (16.2 percent).  
 
Only one of the four fatal accidents occurred prior to 1990; one-third of the accidents since 1994 
(3 of 9) included a fatality. Five of the nine most recent accidents (two of which were fatal) had 
inadequate ice removal prior to takeoff, which led to an overrun of the runway on an aborted 
takeoff in one event and a loss of control during the takeoff climb in the remaining four 
accidents. No injuries occurred in 9 of the 17 accidents, and no damage to the aircraft occurred 
in 28 of the 32 incidents. 
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Figure 6. Number of Scheduled Part 135 icing events per year. 
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Figure 7. Rate of Scheduled Part 135 icing events (per million flight hours). 
 
 
Among Nonscheduled Part 135 flights, slightly more icing-related accidents than incidents 
occurred in most years (see Figure 8). Of the four flight groups examined, Nonscheduled Part 
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135-NS had the highest percentage of icing-related incidents (2.3 percent) and the second 
highest percentage of both icing-related accidents (5.7 percent) and icing-related fatal accidents 
(7.9 percent). Only 27 persons died in Nonscheduled Part 135 icing-related accidents. No 
injuries occurred in 21 of the 61 accidents, and no damage to the aircraft occurred in 22 of the 
48 incidents. A slight downward trend is evident in the flight-hour-adjusted rates for icing-related 
Nonscheduled Part 135 events (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 8. Number of Nonscheduled Part 135 icing events per year. 
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Figure 9. Rate of Nonscheduled Part 135 icing events (per million flight hours). 
 
 
In the eight years prior to and including 1995, the average number of Part 91 icing-related 
events was 98. In the next eight years (1996-2003), the average dropped to 49 (see Figure 10). 
The largest drop was among incidents (from 36 to 12), and the smallest drop was among the 
icing accidents that did not involve carburetor icing (from 24 to 16). A significant decrease was 
noted in the flight-hour-adjusted rates for icing-related events (see Figure 11). Only 3.6 percent 
of fatal Part 91 accidents were related to icing; this was the lowest percentage among the four 
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flight categories that were examined. Although 350 persons died in icing-related accidents, this 
represents only 4 percent of all Part 91 deaths in this time period (again, the lowest of the four 
percentages). No injuries occurred in nearly half of the icing-related accidents (390 of 788), and 
no aircraft damage occurred in 229 of the 390 incidents (59 percent). 
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Figure 10. Number of Part 91 icing events per year. 
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Figure 11. Rate of Part 91 icing events (per million flight hours). 
 
 
Each accident report specifies the type of engine that was installed on the aircraft. Because the 
IRAC project includes engine research, an examination was conducted of all events in the 
dataset based on engine type. The possible engine types (ref. 10-14) are: 
 
• Reciprocating: Also known as a piston engine, the reciprocating engine is a heat engine 
that uses one or more pistons to convert pressure into a rotating motion. 
 
• Turbojet: Turbojet engines are inefficient and noisy engines that are used by mostly 
older aircraft and consist of an air inlet, air compressor, combustion chamber, gas 
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turbine, and nozzle.  These engines are the simplest and oldest kind of general-purpose 
jet engine. 
 
• Turboprop: Turboprop engines are similar to turbojet engines except that additional 
stages are included in the turbine to recover more power to turn the propeller. Turboprop 
engines are generally used on small or slow subsonic aircraft because they are highly 
efficient at modest flight speeds (i.e., below 450 mph). 
 
• Turbofan: A turbofan engine is similar to a turbojet engine and essentially consists of a 
ducted fan with a smaller diameter turbojet engine that is mounted behind it to power the 
fan.  Turbofans are used by most large commercial aircraft because of their fuel 
efficiency and quiet operation. 
 
• Turboshaft: In principle, a turboshaft engine is similar to a turbojet engine, except that it 
features additional turbine expansion to extract heat energy from the exhaust and 
convert it to output shaft power. The name turboshaft is most commonly applied to 
engines that power ships, helicopters, tanks, locomotives, and hovercraft. 
 
For a small number of accidents, the engine type is unknown. Figures 12 through 15 display the 
percentage of total accidents each year for which the aircraft engine was of a particular type. 
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Figure 12. Part 121 accidents by engine type. 
 
Part 121 aircraft (see Figure 12) use primarily turbofan engines (62 percent overall), although 
the number of turboprops engines (19 percent overall) increased in 1997 (when Part 121 was 
expanded to include flights that previously would have been considered Part 135). 
 
Scheduled Part 135 aircraft (see Figure 13) use either reciprocating engines (52 percent) or 
turboprop engines (44 percent) almost exclusively. 
 
Nonscheduled Part 135 aircraft (see Figure 14) primarily have used reciprocating engines (79 
percent), with turboprop engines (15 percent) becoming more popular in recent years. Part 91 
aircraft (see Figure 15) use reciprocating engines almost exclusively (96 percent overall). 
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Figure 13. Scheduled Part 135 accidents by engine type. 
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Figure 14. Nonscheduled Part 135 accidents by engine type. 
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Figure 15 - Part 91 accidents by engine type. 
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Figures 16 through 19 present the same information as shown in Figures 12-15, for only those 
accidents that involved fatalities. 
                                                                    
For Part 121 operations (see Figure 16), more than half (55 percent) of the fatal accidents 
occurred in aircraft with turbofan engines, but this is still less than the percentage (62 percent) 
of aircraft with turbofan engines that were involved in both fatal and nonfatal accidents. The 
percentage of turboprop engines was also slightly lower (13 percent rather than 19 percent), 
while relatively more fatal accidents occurred with reciprocating, turbojet, and unknown engine 
types. In particular, 13 percent of the fatal accidents have unknown engine types. In 2002, no 
Part 121 accidents included a fatality.  
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Figure 16. Part 121 fatal accidents by engine type. 
 
 
For Scheduled Part 135 operations (see Figure 17), the percentages for fatal accidents are 
similar to those for all accidents with respect to engine type. The fatal accidents occurred 
predominantly on aircraft with reciprocating or turboprop engines (96 percent), with slightly more 
fatal accidents on aircraft with turboprop engines (51 percent). No fatal accidents occurred in 
1998 and 2002. 
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Figure 17. Scheduled Part 135 fatal accidents by engine type. 
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For both Nonscheduled Part 135 (see Figure 18) and Part 91 operations (see Figure 19), the 
distribution of engine type in fatal accidents is remarkably similar to that for fatal/non-fatal 
accidents combined. The percentages for fatal accidents in turboprop aircraft were slightly 
higher than for the combined group (16.5 percent versus 15 percent for Nonscheduled Part 135; 
4 percent versus 2 percent for Part 91 respectively). 
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Figure 18.  Nonscheduled Part 135 fatal accidents by engine type. 
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Figure 19. Part 91 fatal accidents by engine type. 
 
Recall that when ramp- and security-related accidents were eliminated from the dataset (see 
Table 2), 9.5 percent of the total fatal air carrier (Part 121) accidents were caused by icing. This 
percentage is greater than that for general aviation (Part 91) or commuter/air taxi (Part 135), 
which were 3.7 percent and 8 percent respectively.  The aviation community generally attributes 
the large number of icing accidents in Part 121 operations to aircraft with turboprop engines and 
because a reduction in the use of turboprop engines has been noted for Part 121 operations 
during the past 10 years, aviation experts assume that icing is no longer a significant problem 
for Part 121 operations.  This assumption is disputed for two reasons. First, although the 
majority of Part 121 operators indeed use jet aircraft, turboprop and piston engines still 
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comprise a significant portion of the this operating category. For example, in 2004, 59 percent of 
the passenger aircraft used by regional airlines had jet engines, but turboprop and piston (i.e. 
reciprocating) engines accounted for an additional 41 percent of the aircraft in operation (ref. 
15). Second, although two of the four fatal Part 121 icing accidents that occurred during the 
period of study were in turboprops, the other fatal accidents involved aircraft that were equipped 
with turbofan and turbojet engines (see Table 3).  
 
 
Table 3. Part 121 Fatal Icing Accidents 
 
Event date Location Airline Engine type 
3/15/89 West Lafayette, IN Mid Pacific Turboprop 
2/17/91 Cleveland, OH Ryan International Turbojet 
3/22/92 Flushing, NY US Air Turbofan 
10/31/94 Roselawn, IN American Eagle Turboprop 
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2.2 NASA Analysis of ASRS Data 
 
Database 
The data in this section of the report were gathered from the ASRS database. As of the writing 
of this report, the database archives incident reports that were submitted between January 1988 
and February 2007. The total number of reports in the database from this time period is a little 
less than 137,000. 
 
The ASRS is a voluntary reporting system, and reports can be submitted by anyone who is 
involved in an incident. The majority of the reports appear to be filed by the flight crew. All of the 
reports that are accepted into the ASRS database have been reviewed, screened, and coded by 
an analyst. The proportion of reported incidents that are rejected is unknown. 
 
The ASRS database is accessible online at http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov. 
 
Methodology 
The data set used in this analysis consists of 663 reports that are highly likely to have icing as a 
significant factor. To retrieve these reports, we used the ASRS online search tool. The query 
had two parts: 
1) Primary problem: weather 
2) Free text search string: 
"ic% OR rime OR rhime OR de-ice OR deice OR sleet OR frost" 
The Primary problem field has16 possible category selections which are mutually exclusive. The 
free text search is performed across three fields: narrative, synopsis, and keywords. The 
narrative is a part of the raw report, and is retained just as it was submitted by the reporter. The 
synopsis and keywords are added by an analyst later. 
 
While developing the search string, we checked possible alternate spellings of sleet—“slete,” 
“sleat,” and “sle%t” - and found no occurrences of these alternate spellings. In his report, 
Green's (ref. 8) search string included the term glaze. We did not include this term because 
each report that contained the word glaze in reference to an environmental factor also contained 
the word ice. (Five such reports met this criterion.) In the single report in which the word glaze 
appeared without the term ice, it referred to the condition of someone's eyes. 
 
Although most or all of the reports in the data set appear to involve engine or wing icing, the 
reports have not been reviewed exhaustively. From our experience with the database, we know 
that weather-related ice problems also can refer to ice on the runway as well as the aircraft.  
 
Icing-Related Incidents Versus All Weather-Related Incidents  
We compared the number of icing-related incidents with both the total number of incidents and 
the total number of weather-related incidents that were reported over the last 10 years (see 
Table 4). We use the term weather incidents to mean the incidents that are retrieved by 
searching for items that have weather as the primary cause. 
 
In all years, the number of icing-related incidents is very small relative to the total number of 
incidents. However, icing is a significant fraction of all weather-related incidents. Although the 
last three years show fewer weather incidents, note that fewer incidents overall were recorded 
for the same time period. 
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Table 4. Icing Versus Weather Incidents in ASRS 
 
Year 
Number of 
icing-
related 
incidents 
Percentage of 
incidents 
related to 
icing 
Total 
Number of 
incidents 
Percentage of 
incidents 
related to 
weather 
Number of 
weather-
related 
incidents 
1997 52 0.65 8018 16 332 
1998 34 0.40 8428 12 276 
1999 29 0.29 9866 12 245 
2000 38 0.48 7998 16 232 
2001 21 0.24 8612 11 197 
2002 26 0.36 7198 13 201 
2003 32 0.39 8143 12 266 
2004 27 0.44 6200 17 161 
2005 25 0.71 3524 23 109 
2006 11 0.21 5196 9 188 
 
 
Incidents by FAR Operation 
Incident reporters are responsible for documenting the FAR under which they were operating at 
the time of the incident. The applicable regulations for this field in the ASRS database are Parts 
91, 119, 121, 125, 129, and 135; an other choice is provided for all others. In the icing data set, 
none of the aircraft were reported as operating under FAR Part 125.  
 
Table 5 shows the number of icing-related incidents for selected FAR operations. The total 
number of incidents and the total number of weather-related incidents are included in this table 
for comparison purposes.  
 
Table 5. Subset of ASRS Weather-Related Incidents by Select FAR Operation 
 
Year 
Part 
91 
Part 
119 
Part 
121 
Part 
135 
Number of weather-
related incidents 
Number of total 
incidents 
1997 15 0 29 7 332 8018 
1998 15 0 13 4 276 8428 
1999 15 1 9 2 245 9866 
2000 12 0 24 2 232 7998 
2001 10 0 6 2 197 8612 
2002 8 0 15 3 201 7198 
2003 20 0 12 0 266 8143 
2004 14 0 12 1 161 6200 
2005 13 0 8 3 109 3524 
2006 7 0 3 1 188 5196 
 
Incidents by Flight Phase 
For the Flight phase field, incident reporters can select multiple flight phases. A visual scan of 
the reports shows that nearly all of the reports specify multiple flight phases. This field allows 
primary categories and subcategories. Counts for the primary categories are given in Table 6. 
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Table 6. ASRS Icing-Related Incidents by Flight Phase 
 
Flight Phase Number of Incidents 
Climb-out 98 
Cruise 325 
Descent 193 
Ground 106 
Landing 133 
 
 
Incidents by Resolutory Actions 
Resolutory actions are the actions taken by the flight crew or controller or other circumstances 
that occurred to resolve an anomaly during the flight. Of the 663 icing-related incidents, 141 
resulted in the crew declaring an emergency, and 16 resulted in an emergency landing. In this 
analysis, we provide counts of the categories for those actions that included crew action but not 
for other types of actions (Table 7). These actions are not mutually exclusive; incident reporters 
could select more than one entry for this field. 
 
Table 7. ASRS Icing-Related Incidents with Resolutory Actions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incidents That Involved Carburetor Icing 
Carburetor icing incidents were found by searching for the string “carb” within the narrative 
section of the report (Table 8). Of the 663 icing reports, this search returned 9 incidents that 
mentioned carburetor icing. 
 
Table 8. ASRS Incidents With Carburetor Icing  
 
Year Count 
1990 1 
1994 1 
1996 1 
1998 2 
2000 1 
2001 1 
2003 2 
 
Incidents by Anomaly Classification 
Incident reporters can select multiple entries for the Anomaly field. Of the 663 icing-related 
incidents, 172 reports contained Aircraft equipment problem as one of the anomalies. This 
anomaly can be further subcategorized into “critical” or “less severe”; 121 incidents were 
classified as critical, and 51 incidents were classified as less severe. 
Resolutory Action Number of Icing-Related Incidents 
Declared emergency 141 
Landed in emergency 16 
Landed as precaution 7 
Rejected takeoff 9 
Executed go around 2 
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Although the anomalies cab be subcategorized, only the primary anomalies are listed shown 
Table 9. 
 
Table 9. ASRS Icing-Related Incidents by Anomaly Field 
 
Anomaly 
Number of icing-related 
incidents 
Equipment problem 172 
Airspace violation 5 
Altitude deviation 165 
Cabin event 8 
Conflict (airborne or ground) 28 
Excursions 156 
Ground encounters 12 
Incursion 7 
In-flight encounter 532 
Nonadherence 267 
Other 415 
 
 
Incidents by Engine Type 
Table 10 shows the 663 incidents broken down by engine type.  
 
Table 10: ASRS Icing-Related Incidents by Engine Type 
 
 
Engine 
Type 
Number of icing-related 
incidents 
reciprocating 223 
turbojet 208 
turboprop 87 
unknown 46 
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3. REVIEW OF PRIOR AVIATION STATISTICAL STUDIES 
 
A number of previous studies have been conducted that examine historical aviation data to 
determine the impact of icing on accidents and incidents. One such study was funded by NASA 
(ref. 8). Two others were led by other agencies, such as the FAA; however NASA employees 
were members of the analysis teams. The remaining study was conducted by the NTSB without 
any known NASA interaction. Although many of the studies used the same databases for their 
analyses, considerable differences exist in their results due to the variations in the respective 
study assumptions and constraints.  
 
3.1 Green Study of Inflight Icing 
 
At the 2007 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics conference in Reno, NV, Steven 
Green presented the results of his study of inflight icing accidents and incidents in the United 
States (ref. 8). Three databases were used for the study: (1) the NTSB Accident Database and 
Synopses, (2) the FAA Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), and (3) the NASA Aviation 
Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Green searched for the terms “icing,” “freezing,” “rime, “ 
“glaze,” “sleet” and “frost” in all three databases and narrowed the set of events to those that 
occurred between January 1, 1978, and December 31, 2002. A variety of parameters were 
examined, including: weather (i.e., METAR, also known as “aviation routine weather reports”), 
aircraft characteristics from Type Certificate Data Sheets or the FAA’s Aircraft Registry, level of 
pilot experience, and operating rules (e.g., FAR Parts 91 and 135).  
 
Some notable observations from this data analysis are: 
• Freezing rain was involved in 33 percent of the total events that involved precipitation, 
• The ASRS reports indicated that although pilots attempt to minimize the amount of ice 
accretion by using rapid descent, their efforts are often hampered by Air Traffic Control 
requirements. 
 
 
3.2 Petty/Floyd Review of U.S. Airframe-Icing Accidents 
 
A review of U.S. airframe-icing accidents was conducted by the NTSB (ref. 3) and the overall 
objective was to update a study of aircraft icing hazards that focused on accidents that occurred 
in the 1970’s and the 1980’s (ref. 18) . Petty and Floyd (ref. 3) used NTSB accident data from 
1982 - 2000 and examined three types of aircraft operations: Part 91, Part 121, and Part 135. 
They also looked at the month, phase of flight, location (U.S. state) in which the icing accidents 
occurred, and the highest certification of the pilot in command at the time of the accident. The 
majority of airframe accidents occurred in Part 91 (80.6 percent), followed by Part 135 (17.6 
percent), and Part 121 (1.7 percent). However, during the time period that was studied, 60 
percent of Part 121 accidents were fatal compared with 47 percent of Part 91 and 26 percent of 
Part 135 airframe-icing accidents. Only 10 fatal Part 121 accidents occurred in the period of 
observation. The number of Part 91 accidents dropped from a high of 49 at the beginning of the 
review period to 17 accidents in the year 2000, which correlated with the overall decrease in 
Part 91 accidents. 
 
Petty and Floyd (ref. 3) stated in their report that GA and Part 135 are more likely to encounter 
icing conditions because they “fly at lower altitudes and slower speeds than air transport 
aircraft,” but they did not provide data in their report to support this assumption. For this reason 
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the engine type was also examined in the IRAC Accident/Incident Study, and the results were 
presented and discussed in Section 2.   
 
3.3 Army Aircraft Icing Report 
 
The Army Safety Center searched its database of 54,081 Army aircraft accidents and incidents 
that occurred from fiscal year 1985 to 1999 for events that were coded as “aircraft icing” or 
“significant weather,” such as sleet or freezing rain (ref. 17). A total of 255 events resulted from 
this query; however, based on the narrative summaries only 172 of these accidents were truly 
icing related. The remaining non-genuine icing accidents were not removed from the total icing 
accident data set because icing could not be definitively ruled out as a factor in the accidents. 
Of the 255 icing events, 85 involved fixed-wing aircraft and the remaining two-thirds involved 
helicopters.  If we base our assumptions purely on the data, we can conclude that icing is not a 
high-frequency safety problem for the Army because it accounts for only 0.5 percent of the total 
accidents during the study period. However, these relatively small numbers are still of concern 
due to the Army’s strict regulations in regard to aircraft and icing conditions: 
 
“…aircraft will not be flown into known or forecast severe icing conditions” 
(Aviation Flight Regulations, AR 95).  
The regulation also states that, if a flight is to be made into known or forecast 
moderate icing conditions, the aircraft must be equipped with adequate deicing or 
anti-icing equipment. 
 
To mitigate the risks of icing-related events, better in-flight icing detection and preflight deicing 
capabilities were recommended in the report.  
 
 
3.4 NASDAC Review of NTSB Weather-Related Accidents 
 
The National Safety Data Analysis Center (NASDAC) is the former name of the current ASIAS 
(Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing) system. The purpose of ASIAS is to enable 
the exchange of multiple types of aviation safety data and information. ASIAS staff members 
examined NTSB aviation accident and incident data from 1994 to 2003 to identify any events in 
which weather was a causal or contributing factor (ref. 18).The ASIAS staff also looked at the 
relationship between the types of weather that were involved in the events and other 
parameters, such as type of operation and phase of flight.  
 
Weather was cited as a contributing or causal factor in 21.3 percent of the 19,562 accidents that 
occurred in the study period. Out of the 4,159 weather-related accidents, icing accounted for 7.0 
percent of the total accidents. The significance of icing differs based on the operation type. For 
example, only 0.8 percent (i.e. one accident) of the 124 weather-related part 121 accidents 
involved icing, but icing was a factor in 10 percent and 7.1 percent of the Part 135 and Part 91 
accidents, respectively.  
 
 
3.5 Summary of Statistical Study Parameters 
 
One of the reasons that a comparison of the results from various studies can be difficult is the 
differences in the study constraints and assumptions (see Table 11). Although many of these 
studies used the same accident and incident databases, often a subset of the database (e.g., 
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specific event years, FAR operations) is used for analysis. For example, we examined the 
differences between the results of the ASIAS weather study (see section 3.4) and those from 
the NASA analysis of the recent NTSB accident and incident data (see section 2.1). The results 
of these studies differ for two primary reasons. First, the ASIAS study covers a subset (years 
1994 – 2003) of the total accidents that were examined in the NASA study (years 1988 – 2003). 
In the NASA study data, six Part 121 icing-related accidents were identified (Two with loss of 
control in flight, two with loss of control during takeoff, one with loss of control during 
approach/landing and one with extensive engine damage). However, even if the data set is 
reduced to the same period as that used in the ASIAS study, three Part 121 accidents were 
identified in the NASA study, which still differs from the ASIAS results. The reason for this 
discrepancy is that the ASIAS analysis relied solely on NTSB accident-classification codes or 
primary accident cause to identify accident categories. Thus, according to the ASIAS analysis, 
the accident on October 31, 1994 in Roselawn, IN would be the only Part 121 event that is icing 
related. However, according to the NASA study, the Part 121 accidents that occurred on March 
14, 1997 (ice ingestion in both engines), and March 19, 2001 (failure to maintain airspeed 
during an encounter with severe icing conditions), also are icing related.  
 
Table 11. Summary of Statistical Study Parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author/ study 
title 
Operation 
type Database(s) 
Country of 
operations Event years 
Total number 
of icing 
events 
Green Part 91 Part 135 
NTSB Accident, 
FAA AIDS, 
NASA ASRS 
United States 1978 – 2002 645 ( A/I) 299 (ASRS) 
Petty/ 
Floyd 
GA 
Part 135 
Part 121 
NTSB Accident United States 1982 – 2000 583 
Army Data 
Center Part 91 Army Aircraft A/I 
Worldwide (U.S. 
Army) 1985 – 1999 255 
ASIAS 
Part 91 
Part 135S 
Part 135NS 
Part 121 
NSTB Accident United States 1994 – 2003  
NASA 
Analysis of 
NTSB Data 
Part 91 
Part 135S 
Part 135NS 
Part 121 
NTSB Accident, 
FAA AIDS United States 1988 – 2003 
872 (NTSB) 
520 (AIDS) 
NASA 
Analysis of 
ASRS Data 
Part 91 
Part 121 
Part 135 
NASA ASRS United States 1988 – 2007 663 
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4. REVIEW OF AVIATION SAFETY PRIORITY LISTS  
 
In recent years, subject-matter experts have conducted a number of studies that included 
recommendations for improving the safety of the air transportation system. This section contains 
a review of these safety priority lists with special emphasis on the significance of icing in 
improving aviation safety.  
 
4.1 Decadal Study of Civil Aeronautics 
 
The Aeronautics Space and Engineering Board within the National Research Council used a 
modified quality function deployment (QFD) process to identify and rank research and 
technology challenges. This study (ref. 19) which was sponsored by NASA, began with a 
September 2005 kick-off meeting in Herndon, VA.  A steering committee, along with several 
supporting panels, conducted a series of additional meetings, which culminated in a June 2006 
report in which a total of 51 high-priority challenges were identified. Two of these high-priority 
challenges, A6 (Aerodynamics robust to atmospheric disturbances and adverse weather 
conditions, including icing) and D6 (Improved onboard weather systems and tools), are related 
to icing.  
 
Challenge A6 is based on the need for additional research to develop techniques to monitor and 
mitigate adverse weather conditions, such as icing, wind sheer, and free- stream turbulence. 
The expected results of this research include the development of three-dimensional icing-
prediction tools and systems with better measurement and mitigation of upstream environmental 
conditions. In particular, better icing-prediction methods would help reduce the high cost of 
aircraft and helicopter icing certification. The recommendation was made that NASA conduct 
research in this area because the agency’s icing wind tunnels and research aircraft would 
complement the infrastructure that is found in industry and academia. This challenge was also 
rated as being highly relevant to NASA’s Mission.  
 
Improved on-board weather systems and tools (challenge D6) are necessary to cost effectively 
integrate real-time weather information into four dimensional integrated control of flight. The 
goal is for aircraft to share on-board sensor data about wind, icing conditions, lightning, and 
turbulence via data links with ATC and other aircraft.  This information would be used in the air 
traffic management (ATM) system to reduce delays, especially in high-traffic areas, and to 
prevent weather-related accidents. The rationale for NASA conducting research in this area was 
because the agency has “an outstanding research facility for icing tests and evaluation and the 
infrastructure to develop and test weather-related tools.” The report also stated that this 
research is central to NASA’s Safety and Capacity missions.  
 
A third research and technology challenge that is related to icing, B13 (Improved propulsion 
system tolerance to weather, inlet distortion, wake ingestion, bird strike, and foreign-object 
damage) was also identified. One of the proposed outcomes of this challenge is the 
development of physics-based models that can more accurately predict the effects of adverse 
weather (e.g., rain, hail, ice) on fans, compressors, and combustor stability. Although this 
challenge received high scores as a national priority, it did not make the overall high-priority list 
because NASA has few facilities, such as icing tunnels, that are relevant to this challenge.  
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4.2 Review of NASA’s Aerospace Technology Enterprise 
 
The National Research Council was asked by NASA and the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) to review NASA’s former Aerospace Technology Enterprise (currently known as the 
Aerospace Research Mission Directorate.) The review began in early 2003 and, at the time, the 
Aerospace Technology Enterprise comprised three programs: Vehicle Systems, Airspace 
Systems, and Aviation Safety. At the time of the review, the Aviation Safety Program contained 
an aircraft icing subproject, which the committee deemed “the best technical work in the 
Aviation Safety Program” and “a unique national asset that is vital to the air transportation 
community, both civil and military.” In the final report, which was published in 2004, the 
committee recommended that NASA continue the research to understand and mitigate aircraft 
icing. Some specific future research areas that were identified in the report include additional 
investigations to determine the effects of icing on aircraft aerodynamics, the development of 
methods to sense and document actual icing conditions, and smart icing systems. The report 
also advocated increased research in the areas of anti-icing fluids and the assessment of 
holdover times.  
 
4.3 CAST/JIMDAT Safety Implementation Plans  
 
The Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) was formally established on June 23, 1998.  Its 
mission is to provide government and industry leadership to develop and focus implementation 
of an integrated, data-driven strategy to improve commercial aviation safety. The members of 
CAST are a variety of stakeholders, including representatives from government, industry, pilot 
groups, air traffic controllers, and others.  The Joint Implementation Data Analysis Team 
(JIMDAT) was formed by CAST to develop methods for prioritizing safety-enhancement 
implementation plans.  JIMDAT accomplishes this mandate by: 
• Estimating the potential risk decrease. 
• Tracking those projects that are selected for implementation. 
• Evaluating project outcomes to determine whether the estimated risk was lessened. 
• Assessing any improvements that are identified outside of CAST. 
• Identifying other areas of interest beyond the six prioritized FAA Safer Skies Agenda 
accident categories. 
 
In its original list of recommendations to CAST, JIMDAT proposed a Safety Enhancement (SE) 
to release the risk of loss of control caused by icing:  
 
SE 39: Criteria for Flight in Icing Conditions for New Airplane Designs 
To reduce fatal accidents due to loss of control, recommend and support the 
development of amended icing certification criteria, for new airplane designs not 
equipped with evaporative (i.e. hot wing) systems, that include performance and 
handling qualities requirements for the following: 
- Residual ice 
- Intercycle ice 
- Delayed anti-icing/deicing system activation 
- Deicing/anti-icing system malfunction 
 
 
JIMDAT considers SE 39 to be an ongoing enhancement that has not been completed. Over the 
years, JIMDAT has made modifications to its original list of safety enhancements and has 
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identified additional SE’s that are either appropriate for long-term research or address the 
“remaining risk” in the air transportation system. One of the research SE’s is related to icing:  
 
SE 119: Loss of Control – Icing (research)  
For aircraft that incorporate non-evaporative ice protection systems, develop 
systems that sense the presence of ice accretion on the aircraft, automatically 
activate and manage the ice protection systems, and provide the pilot with 
feedback including the effect on measured aircraft performance, stability, and 
control. 
- Provides annunciation that alerts the crew to respond appropriately to 
the icing hazard. 
- Ground- and aircraft-based means of detection of meteorological icing 
conditions. 
- Define the effects of all ice accretions, with particular emphasis on the 
roll effect due to ice-contaminated wings. 
- Understand the effects of super-cooled large droplets (SLD). 
 
 
The three icing-related “remaining risk” SE’s that JIMDAT has recommended for approval by the 
CAST are as follows: 
 
SE 133: Turboprop Aircraft Ice Detection Systems 
For all turboprop aircraft with non-evaporative ice protection systems and non-
powered flight controls used in Part 121 operations, manufacturers should: (1) 
For new type designs, adapt and implement systems that automatically detect 
ice, measure the rate of ice accretion, and provide annunciation to the flight crew 
and (2) For current turboprop production aircraft and existing type design, 
conduct a study to determine the feasibility of installing systems that 
automatically detect ice, measure the rate of ice accretion, and provide 
annunciation to the flight crew 
 
SE 134R1: Aircraft Design – Avionics 
Avionic equipment manufacturers and aircraft manufacturers should develop and 
install smart pitch guidance systems on new type designs to prevent over rotation 
in conjunction with a low energy state or aerodynamic degradation due to the 
presence of ice on critical flight surfaces. The smart pitch avionics system should 
provide to the flight crew appropriate flight guidance information, the current 
aircraft energy state and performance margins with respect to stall speed and 
maximum angle of attack for all icing conditions for which an aircraft has been 
certified.  
 
SE 136: Training – Engine Surge Recovery 
To prevent fatal accidents resulting from an engine surge caused by ice 
ingestions, airlines should provide adequate training for flight crews to ensure 
appropriate responses to this event. This training should include engine-out 
identification, engine surge recovery procedures, and associated aircraft 
recovery in all the varying combinations. Key to this training is that it be 
accomplished prior to the pilot being assigned to the line or introduced to new 
equipment. 
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To understand the relative significance of these icing enhancements, Figure 20 contains the 
potential impact of all of the recommended enhancements on reducing risk. Note that only 6 out 
of the 19 total enhancements have higher risk-reduction scores than the 3 icing enhancements.  
Four of the higher scoring enhancements are related to cargo and the other two are related to 
maintenance/systems.  
 
% Reduction of Fatality Risk That Could Be Mitigated by Individual RR SEs 
(1987-2000 Part 121 Hull Loss and Fatal Accidents)
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Figure 20.  JIMDAT “remaining risk” safety enhancements. 
(Source: Rob Noges, JIDMAT member) 
 
 
Two additional icing-related enhancements have been examined by JIMDAT but have not been 
submitted for CAST approval. One of the factors for delaying their recommendation is the 
expected cost of implementing these SE’s as compared with their impact on risk reduction. The 
impact of these additional enhancements on the risk to the air transportation system has not 
been calculated. The two additional enhancements are: 
 
 
SE 135: Ground Operations 
To prevent fatal accidents resulting from ice-contaminated wings, control 
surfaces, and other critical surfaces, aircraft operators, airport authorities, 
regulators, and air traffic control should develop and implement ground 
operations policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of ice contamination 
on flight critical surfaces. 
 
SE137:  Weather Information 
To prevent fatal accidents and incidents resulting from inadequate aircraft deicing 
and anti-icing and runway and taxiway snow removal operations due to 
insufficient information on surface weather conditions, weather information 
providers should provide airport-zone-specific advanced- detection and forecast 
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products (e.g., Weather Support to Deicing Decision Making (WSDDM)) to 
operators, flight crews, and airport authorities for ground operations. 
 
 
Aircraft Icing Research Alliance (AIRA) 
 
The Aircraft Icing Research Alliance is an organization that was formed in 2002 to increase 
coordination of aircraft icing research. Members of the AIRA include representatives from 
NASA, the FAA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Transport 
Canada (TC), Environment Canada (EC), the National Research Council of Canada (NRC), 
National Defense of Canada, and Defense Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) of the 
United Kingdom. Industry, academia, and other nations also participate in the AIRA either by 
assisting with setting research priorities or via joint research as part of an AIRA subcommittee.    
 
The AIRA created a list of 87 icing-related research focus areas (RFA’s), which are divided into 
six themes: (1) in-flight icing, (2) aircraft icing while on the ground, (3) runway winter 
contamination, (4) operations, human factors, and training, (5) safety and economic analysis, 
and (6) emerging technologies. The AIRA identified 17 of these as priority RFA’s, and results 
are shown in Table 12. Note that three of the themes do not contain priority RFA’s and the in-
flight icing theme is further divided into seven sub-themes. (ref. 20)   
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Table 12. AIRA Priority Research Focus Areas (RFA’s) 
 
In-flight icing Aircraft icing while on the ground 
Operations, human factors 
and training 
 
Aerodynamic performance 
and handling qualities 
 Aerodynamic performance 
and handling qualities in icing 
 
Atmospheric characterization 
 High ice-water content 
 
Weather and forecasting 
 Nowcasting development 
and validation 
 Dissemination of weather 
information 
 Forecasting development 
and validation 
 Remote sensing systems for 
icing detection 
 
Facilities, simulators and 
instrumentation systems 
 Comparison of tools, 
techniques and facilities and 
the establishment of 
standards 
 
Fundamental ice physics 
 Ice formation mechanics 
 Scaling 
 
Ice shedding 
 Ice shedding mechanisms 
 
Propulsion and Power Plant 
Icing 
 High ice-water ingestion 
 
 
 Fluid integrity detection 
system 
 Performance effects of 
limited contamination 
 
 Flight crew training module 
for operations in icing 
conditions 
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4.5 NTSB Most-Wanted List 
 
The NTSB publishes an annual list (ref. 21) of the most-wanted transportation safety 
improvements for various modes of transportation (e.g., highway). In 1996, a recommendation 
was added to the aviation list to “reduce dangers to aircraft flying in icing conditions.” The 
Board’s specific recommendation to the FAA about this issue is as follows: 
 
Use current research on freezing rain and large water droplets to revise the way 
aircraft are designed and approved for flight in icing conditions. 
 
Conduct additional research with NASA to identify realistic ice accumulations and 
incorporate new information into aircraft certification and pilot training 
requirements. 
 
NTSB icing expert Dan Bower stated in 2005 (ref. 22) 
 
“...the industry may not yet fully appreciate the danger of even a small amount of 
ice on upper wing surfaces…Research results have shown that fine particles of 
frost or ice, the size of a grain of table salt and distributed as sparsely as one per 
square centimeter over an airplanes wing’s upper surface can destroy enough lift 
to prevent that airplane from taking off.”  
 
The FAA responded to this recommendation by making revisions to and developing new rules to 
address icing, which resulted in a total of five rule-making activities. Beyond these activities, the 
FAA contends that additional actions are not necessary in regard to flight in icing conditions. 
The NTSB recommends additional actions and although the number of icing-related accidents 
and serious incidents is small, considers icing to be a significant aviation danger. In June 2007, 
the NSTB asked the FAA to complete the following actions: (1) complete efforts to revise icing 
certification criteria, testing requirements, and restrictions on operations in icing conditions and 
(2) evaluate all aircraft that are certified for flight in icing conditions using the new criteria and 
standards. (ref. 23) 
 
 
4.6 Summary of Icing Research Priorities 
Based on the prioritized lists that were discussed earlier and on additional information in regard 
to icing-related atmospheric problems (ref. 24-26), the following are the highest priorities for 
aviation icing-related research: 
 
• Improved propulsion system tolerance to weather 
− Develop more accurate physics-based models that can predict the effects of adverse 
weather on fans, compressors, and combustor stability. 
− Conduct research on high ice-water ingestion. 
− Conduct research on high-altitude ice-particle ingestion. 
 
• Development of methods to sense and document actual icing conditions 
− Develop systems with better measurement and mitigation of upstream environmental 
conditions. 
− Develop improved on-board weather systems and tools (including incorporation of on-
board sensor data about wind, icing conditions, etc.) 
− Develop and validate better methods for nowcasting. 
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− Develop and validate better methods for forecasting. 
− Develop dissemination of weather information. 
− Develop remote sensing systems for icing detection. 
 
• Research to identify realistic ice accumulations to improve aircraft certification 
and pilot training 
− Conduct research on freezing rain and large water droplets to revise the manner in 
which aircraft are designed and approved for flight in icing conditions. 
− Develop flight crew training module for operations in icing conditions. 
− Conduct research on ice formation mechanics. 
− Measure performance effects of limited contamination. 
− Assess holdover times. 
 
• Aircraft performance and handling qualities in icing 
− Research the effects of icing on aircraft aerodynamics. 
− Study ice shedding mechanisms. 
− Research anti-icing fluids. 
− Define the effects of ice accretions, especially the effect on roll characteristics. 
− Develop smart pitch guidance systems. 
− Develop smart icing systems. 
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5. FUTURE ICING RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS 
 
The expected outcome of this analysis is to provide input for future icing research requirements, 
including the appropriate alignment within the AvSafe Program. Specifically, these requirements 
should address whether future icing research should be conducted through the IRAC project or 
through another AvSafe project, such as the Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) 
Project or the Integrated Intelligent Flight Deck (IIFD) Project. The rationale is that although 
most of the icing research priorities are in the area of flight control, others are related to sensing 
and identification, which are interests for the IIFD and IVHM projects, respectively. This section 
summarizes the published goals and objectives for the IRAC, IVHM, and IIFD projects, 
examines their relevance to the icing research priorities that have been presented in the 
previous section, and presents suggestions for future NASA icing research.  
 
 
5.1 IRAC Goals and Objectives 
 
The objectives of the NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSafe) (ref. 2) are:  
 
• “Conduct long-term, cutting-edge research that will produce tools, methods, and 
technologies to improve the intrinsic safety attributes of current and future 
aircraft.” 
 
• “Overcome safety technology barriers that would otherwise constrain full 
realization of the Next Generation Air Transportation System.” 
 
According to the IRAC Technical Plan (ref. 1), the IRAC project will conduct research to 
advance the state of aircraft flight control to provide onboard control resilience for ensuring safe 
flight in the presence of adverse conditions. The goal of the IRAC project is to arrive at a set of 
validated multidisciplinary integrated aircraft control design tools and techniques for enabling 
safe flight in the presence of adverse conditions (e.g. faults, damage, upsets). The objective is 
to advance the state of the art of adaptive controls as a design option to provide enhanced 
stability and maneuverability margins for safe landing. Adverse events include loss of control 
that is caused by environmental factors and actuator and sensor faults or failures and will 
expand to include more complicated damage conditions. 
 
The IRAC project goals and objectives (refs. 1 and 27) are graphically depicted using an 
objectives tree format (ref. 28) in Figures 21 and 22.  
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Figure 21.  NASA IRAC objectives tree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To improve aircraft safety for current and future aircraft 
(AvSafe Program Goal #1) 
To provide on-board 
control resilience 
To ensure safe flight of current and next generation 
subsonic transports in the presence of adverse 
conditions (faults, damage, and/or upsets) 
To provide enhanced 
stability and 
maneuverability 
margins for safe 
landing 
To develop a set of validated 
multidisciplinary integrated aircraft control 
design tools and techniques 
To advance the 
state of aircraft 
flight control 
To advance the 
state of the art of 
adaptive controls 
as a design 
option 
 
 
 
 
IRAC 
project 
goals and 
objectives 
Key 
 
  Will help to achieve 
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To develop a set of validated multidisciplinary integrated aircraft control design tools and techniques
To develop 
advanced 
methods for 
modeling and 
control of 
aircraft
Integrated 
dynamics 
and flight 
control
To conduct 
fundamental 
research on 
engine 
control and 
engine 
performance
Integrated 
propulsion 
control 
and 
dynamics
To develop 
integrated 
diagnostic and 
prognostic 
aeroservoelastic
methods
Airframe 
and 
structural 
dynamics
To investigate how 
planning, guidance, 
and control concepts 
can be used to 
increase safety of 
flight under 
emergency 
situations that are 
caused by adverse 
conditions
Intelligent 
flight 
planning 
and 
guidance
To validate 
technologies 
that are 
developed by 
IRAC for 
recovery from 
loss-of-control 
flight conditions 
and damage 
scenarios
Validation 
and 
verification 
methods 
and 
testbeds  
Figure 22.  NASA IRAC subproject objectives tree. 
 
 
5.2 IVHM Goals and Objectives 
 
The goals of the IVHM project are to: (1) reduce system and component failures as causal and 
contributing factors in aircraft accidents and incidents and (2) provide continuous on-board 
situational awareness of the state of vehicle health for use by the flight crew, ground crew, and 
maintenance depot.  The purpose of this research is to develop technologies that will enable the 
early detection of system/component degradation and damage and thereby provide the ability to 
prevent or gracefully recover from in-flight failures. The objectives of the IVHM project are as 
follows (ref. 29):  
 
• Develop tools and techniques to: 
− Determine the state of subsystems such that the state of the entire vehicle can be 
determined for accurate prognosis. 
− Diagnose coupled degradation/malfunction/failure/hazard conditions and predict 
their effects on vehicle safety. 
− Mitigate damage/degradation/failures inflight. 
 
• Develop a public database and testing capabilities for IVHM technologies. 
 
5.3 IIFD Goals and Objectives 
 
The IIFD project within the AvSafe Program conducts research that is shared with government 
and industry to create future flight decks that are safer and more capable. One of the advanced 
features that is envisioned for these future flight decks is the integration of external hazard 
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sensors with decision-aiding functions. The objectives tree for the IIFD project is shown in 
Figure 23 (ref. 30). 
 
 
To develop flight deck technologies that mitigate operator, automation and environment induced 
hazards for future operational concepts
To develop 
crew/vehicle 
interface 
technologies 
that reduce the 
risk of pilot 
error
To develop 
monitoring 
technologies 
to enable 
detection of 
unsafe 
behaviors 
To develop fail-safe 
methods for changing 
the operator/ 
automation roles in 
the presence of 
detected disability 
states
To enable robust detection of 
external hazards with 
sufficient time-to-alarm for 
safe maneuvering to avoid 
the hazards
To develop a 
comprehensive 
surveillance system design  
 
 
Figure 23.  NASA IIFD project objectives tree. 
 
5.4 Mapping of Goals to Icing Research Priorities 
 
High-priority icing research issues were summarized in section 4. Based on the current stated 
goals and objectives of the AvSafe IRAC, IIFD, and IVHM projects, Table 13 provides the 
suggested mapping of these goals to the icing research issues. Note that certain research 
issues do not map to an AvSafe project; this is a result of the strict alignment to the current 
project objectives and should not be interpreted as a lack of technical expertise within NASA in 
these icing research areas.  
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Table 13. NASA AvSafe Project Goals Mapped to Icing Research Priorities 
Aviation safety program 
 
 
Icing Research Priorities IRAC 
Flight 
control  
IVHM 
On-board 
sensing 
IIFD 
Remote 
sensing 
Improved propulsion system tolerance to weather 
Development of more accurate physics based models that can 
predict the effects of adverse weather on fans, compressors 
and combustor stability 
X   
High ice water ingestion X   
High altitude ice particle ingestion X   
   
Development of methods to sense and document  
actual icing conditions 
Systems with better measurement and mitigation of upstream 
environmental conditions    
Improved onboard weather systems and tools (including 
incorporation of onboard sensor data about wind, icing 
conditions, etc.) 
 X X 
Nowcasting development and validation    
Forecasting development and validation    
Dissemination of weather information   X 
Remote sensing systems for icing detection   X 
   
Research to identify realistic ice accumulations to  
improve aircraft certification and pilot training 
 
Research on freezing rain (ZR) and large water droplets to 
revise the way aircraft are designed and approved for flight in 
icing conditions 
X  
 
Flight crew training module for operations in icing conditions    
Ice formation mechanics X   
Performance effects of limited contamination X   
Assessment of holdover times    
   
Aircraft performance and handling qualities in icing 
Research on the effects of icing on aircraft aerodynamics X   
Ice shedding mechanisms    
Anti-icing fluids    
Define the effects of ice accretions, especially the effect on roll X   
Smart pitch guidance systems X    
Smart icing systems X   X X 
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Although FAR Part 135 operations have the highest percentage of icing-related events and no 
fatal Part 121 accidents have occurred since 1994, icing is still a safety concern across all 
categories of subsonic aircraft. As previously stated, when ramp- and security-related accidents 
are eliminated from the NTSB data set, 9.5 percent of the total fatal Part 121 accidents were 
attributable to icing, which is more than for Part 91 (3.7 percent), Part 135 Scheduled (8.3 
percent) and Part 135 Nonscheduled (8.0 percent). Three of the six icing accidents in the NASA 
NTSB data study (see section 2.1) involved turboprop engines, while the remaining three 
accidents involved turbofan or turbojet engines. Aircraft with turboprop and reciprocating 
engines still comprise a significant portion of Part 121 operations.  In 2004, 41 percent of the 
aircraft used by regional airlines had turboprop or reciprocating engines. Of the 663 icing 
incidents reported in the voluntary ASRS database for which an engine type was provided, 223 
had reciprocating engines, but 208 had turbojet engines, and 87 had turboprop engines. 
Further, 141 of the 663 total icing-related incidents resulted in the crew declaring an emergency. 
In the Petty and Floyd review (ref.3) of airframe-icing accidents from 1982 to 2000, 60 percent 
of accidents for Part 121 were fatal compared with 47 percent for GA and 26 percent for Part 
135 during the same time period. According to the Green Study (ref. 8), ASRS reports indicate 
that pilots try to minimize the amount of ice accretion by using rapid descent but their efforts are 
often hampered by ATC requirements. Even in military operations, icing still appears to be a 
problem. Only 0.5 percent of U.S. Army aircraft accidents are icing related, but this number is 
still of concern due to the Army’s strict regulations that forbid flight into known or severe icing 
conditions.  
  
A review of studies by subject-matter experts from the NRC, the CAST/JIMDAT, the AIRA, and 
the NTSB was summarized into four high-priority icing research areas: (1) improved propulsion 
system tolerance to weather, (2) development of methods to sense and document actual icing 
conditions, (3) research to identify realistic ice accumulations to improve aircraft certification and 
pilot training, and (4) aircraft performance and handling qualities in icing.  
 
Based on the current stated goals and objectives of the AvSafe IRAC, IIFD, and IVHM projects, 
the suggested mappings of these goals to the icing research issues were listed in Table 13. As 
shown in Table 13, the IRAC project is encouraged to conduct work in all of the identified areas 
except for the “development of methods to sense and document actual icing conditions.”  
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